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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
RUGBY PUB LLC and JERALD

:

SARFOLEAN,
Petitioners/Appellants,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF ALCOHOL BEVERAGE
CONTROL, STATE OF UTAH,
:
Respondent/Appellee.

Case No. 20070955-CA

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT - APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This action comes within the original jurisdiction of this Court under Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a) (Westlaw, 2008 Laws of Utah, Chapter 3).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. On appeal, petitioners raise claims that the district court's decision violated
their rights under the open courts and due process provisions of Utah's Constitution and
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
These issues were not raised in the district court and cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal.
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. This issue was not raised below and was not
considered by the district court.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue is unique to this Court and does not
entail review of the district court's decision.
2. Judge Iwasaki correctly ruled that the Utah Alcoholic Beverage Control
Commission's Order of April 27, 2007 was a final administrative order. It constituted
final agency action from which judicial review could be sought. The petitioners did not
bring their petition for judicial review until July 27, 2007. Because the petition was filed
more than thirty days after the entry of the final agency action, the district court was
without jurisdiction to consider the petitioners' untimely petition
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. This issue was raised by the respondent's
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (R. 44-70, 158-60) and was the basis for the
district court's ruling. R. 171-75.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The district court was called upon to review the
decision reached in an informal administrative proceeding by trial de novo. On appeal
this Court reviews the district court's conclusions of law for correction of error. Kirk v.
Div. of Occupational and Prof 1 Licensing. 815 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah App. 1991).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
All such provisions are set forth verbatim in Appendix A to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control brought an administrative
proceeding against Rugby Pub and Jerald Sarafolean for violations of the Utah Alcoholic
Beverage Control Act. R. 115-23. An evidentiary hearing was held on January 31, 2007.
2

Based on the evidence presented, the hearing officer entered Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Recommended Action on February 26, 2007. R. 20-29. The
hearing officer recommended that the petitioners be assessed fines and administrative
costs totaling $1,168.33. R. 27-28.
At its April 27, 2007 meeting, the Commission adopted the hearing officer's
findings and conclusions. R. 15-16. The Commission's Order of April 27, 2007,
required the petitioners to pay the fines and costs no later than May 15, 2007. Failure to
pay by June 14, 2007 would result in the fines and costs being recovered from the Rugby
Pub's compliance bond. R. 16. The Commission's Order informed the petitioners
(respondents in the administrative proceeding) of their right to seek judicial review in the
district court within thirty days. IdL The petitioners did not seek review of this order.
When the petitioners failed to pay the fines and costs, an Order to Show Cause was
issue by the Commission on June 18, 2007. R. 13. When the fines and costs had still not
been paid by the Commission's meeting on June 29, 2007, the Commission ordered the
compliance bond forfeited as it had stated in its original order (April 27, 2007). R. 61.
Rugby Pub and Jerald Sarafolean filed their petition for judicial review on July 27,
2007. R. 1-6. Petitioners asked the district court to set aside the Commission's Order
assessing fees and costs as part of the relief sought. R. 3. Respondent filed a motion to
dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction. R. 44-70, 158-60. In opposing this motion, the
petitioners argued that the April 27, 2007 order was not a final order and that the
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Commission did not have the authority to order the bond revoked in these circumstances.
R. 108-12. No constitutional claims were raised.
Petitioners also filed a motion for partial summary judgment. R. 71-105, 163-66.
In their motion, petitioners also argued that the Commission did not have the authority to
impose the fines and costs set out in the April 27 order.
In its memorandum decision of November 1, 2007, the district court held that the
Commission's Order of April 27 constituted final agency action and that the petition for
judicial relief was untimely. The court therefore dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction. R. 171-75.
The petitioners filed their notice of appeal on December 3, 2007. R. 176-77.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The following facts are taken from the findings of fact made by the hearing officer
and adopted in whole by the Commission. R. 15, 21-24. The petitioners have not
challenged the facts found by the Commission.
Jerald Sarafolean is the owner of the Rugby and also an employee. R. 22 ^|2. On
November 22, 2006, Mr. Sarafolean served free beer to two undercover officers. R. 2324. This is a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 32 A-10-206(5) (West Supp. 2007)
(prohibiting the sale of beer at less than cost or offering free alcoholic beverages to the
general public).

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In their opening brief, petitioners raise two constitutional claims. They claim their
open courts and due process rights were violated. But these issues were not raised below.
They cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. The only mention of due process rights
in the district court related to a nonparty. This action cannot be used to determine the
rights of a nonparty. Nor do the petitioners have standing to raise the claims of third
persons.
On April 27, 2007, the Commission entered its final agency action. In that order
the Commission found that the petitioners had violated Utah law. The Commission
imposed sanctions for those violations, and stated how the fines and costs imposed should
be satisfied if the petitioners failed to voluntarily comply. Petitioners did not seek
judicial review. They cannot now seek such review by means of challenging a later
enforcement proceeding.
ARGUMENT
I. PETITIONERS CANNOT RAISE OPEN COURT AND DUE
PROCESS CLAIMS FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
Petitioner's opening brief seeks to raise constitutional claims that were not
presented to the district court. At no time did the petitioners argue before Judge Iwasaki
that their rights under the open courts provision of the Utah State Constitution would be
violated if he ruled that their petition for judicial review was untimely. At no time did
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they argue before Judge Iwasaki that such a ruling would violate their rights to due
process.1
In Rspinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ. 797 P.2d 412 (Utah 1990), the plaintiffs
raised a constitutional claim for the first time on appeal. In refusing to consider that
claim, the Utah Supreme Court explained that:
Appellants' first claim is that the realignment violated article I, section 7 of
the Utah Constitution by denying them the liberty to control their children's
education. This claim was raised for the first time on appeal. With limited
exceptions, the practice of this Court has been to decline consideration of
issues raised for the first time on appeal. We therefore do not address this
claim.
Id. at 413 (citations omitted). The limited exceptions to this general rule deal with cases
in which the appellate court is persuaded that "the trial court committed plain error or
exceptional circumstances exist in this case." State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917-18
(Utah App. 1992) (footnote omitted).
It was the duty of the petitioners to raise any constitutional claims in the district
court. This would have permitted Judge Iwasaki to consider these issues. Petitioners
cannot challenge the district court's decision based on claims that were never raised
below. This is especially true where petitioners have not briefed the question of whether
plain error or other exceptional circumstances might exist that could lead this Court to

1

Open courts was never mentioned in the district court. The only mention by the
petitioners of due process rights was in oral argument, and then only in connection with
the alleged rights of Thomas Sarafolean, who is not a party to this action. R. 182 at 13,
17&21.
6

consider this issue for the first time on appeal. Where the petitioners did not analyze an
issue in their opening brief, this Court will not review that issue. State v. Brown. 853
P.2d851,854n.l (Utah 1992).
The only due process claim raised below was on behalf of Thomas Sarafolean.
But he was never a party to this action. The district court could not adjudicate the rights
of a nonparty.
This rule is consistent with the general principle that a trial court
may not render judgment in favor of a nonparty. Courts can generally make
a legally binding adjudication only between the parties actually joined in
the action.
Hiltslev v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Utah 1987) (reversing judgment in favor of an
estate that was not a party to the action). See also Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244,
1263 (Utah 1987) ("A court may not grant relief to a nonparty.").
Nor do the petitioners have standing to claim that a nonparty's rights have been
violated. "[A] party may generally assert only his or her own rights and cannot raise the
claims of third parties who are not before the court." Provo City Corp. v. Thompson,
2004 UT 14,1J9, 86 P.3d 735. See also State v. Herrera. 1999 UT 64, ^42, 993 P.2d 854
("We have long held that one 'may not allege jeopardy or injury to others in order to
confer standing upon his own claims."'). Having failed to raise in the district court any
claim that their rights to due process were violated, the petitioners do not have standing to
raise a claim that a nonparty's right to due process has been violated.
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II THE APRIL 27, 2007 ORDER OF THE COMMISSION
CONSTITUTED FINAL AGENCY ACTION
In its order of April 27, 2007, the Commission adopted the Hearing Officer's
findings and conclusions that the petitioners had violated Utah's statutory prohibition
against offering free alcoholic beverages to the general public. It also imposed the
recommended fines and costs totaling $1,168.33 against the petitioners. The Commission
also determined that the fines and costs would be paid by the petitioners' compliance
bond if not voluntarily paid before June 14, 2007.2 R. 15-16. The order also informed the
petitioners of their right to seek judicial review within thirty days from the date of the
order. R. 16. The petitioners did not seek judicial review until July 27, 2007, well after
the thirty-day period had run.
A petition for judicial review must be filed within thirty days of the date of the
order that constitutes final agency action. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) (West
2004).3 The timely filing of a petition for judicial review, like the timely filing of a notice
of appeal, is jurisdictional. Blauer v. Dep't of Workforce Serv., 2007 UT App 280, T|7,
167 P.3d 1102. See also Union Pac. R.R. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2000 UT 40,%13
999 P.2d 17 (petitions filed after the thirty-day period fail to give courts jurisdiction to

2

Thirty days after the May 15, 2007 deadline for payment set by the Commission.

3

Utah's Administrative Procedure Act has since been renumbered, though the
pertinent language of the statutes has not been changed. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-4-101
to -601 (Westlaw, 2008 Laws of Utah, Chapter 382).
8

review administrative decisions). Petitioners sought to avoid the consequences of their
untimely petition by claiming that the Commission's order was not a final agency action.
The April 27, 2007 Order constituted the final agency action by the Commission.
The Commission made a final determination as to whether the petitioners violated Utah's
law. The Commission made a final determination as to what penalty and costs should be
imposed for the violation. The Commission also made a final determination as to how to
enforce its decision if the petitioners failed to voluntarily pay the fines and costs imposed
by the order. Nothing was left for the Commission to do. The challenged order resolved
all issues before the Commission.
In Union Pacific, the court set out factors to be considered in deciding if an
administrative order qualifies as final agency action.
(1) Has administrative decisionmaking reached a stage where judicial
review will not disrupt the orderly process of adjudication?;
(2) Have rights or obligations been determined or will legal consequences
flow from the agency action?; and
(3) Is the agency action, in whole or in part, not preliminary, preparatory,
procedural, or intermediate with regard to subsequent agency action?
Union Pacific, 2000 UT 40 at U16.
Every element of this test was met by the April 27, 2007 Order. That order found
that the petitioners had violated Utah law and assessed the sanction to be imposed. No
further administrative action was necessary on this issue. Judicial review would not
disrupt the administrative adjudication because the final decision had been reached. The
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same is true of the decision on how the order would be enforced (forfeiture of the bond if
the petitioners did not voluntarily pay).
The April 27, 2007 Order also determined the rights of the parties and the legal
consequences that would flow from its decision. No further administrative proceedings
have been necessary to make such determinations.
Nor was the April 27, 2007 Order "preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or
intermediate." Examples of such orders are "orders remanding the case for further
proceedings, converting informal proceedings into formal ones, and denying motions to
dismiss." Id. at ^[21. Unlike the examples used by the court in Union Pacific, the
Commission's order made final findings and conclusions as to the rights of the parties and
what sanctions would be imposed. Final decisions made on the merits of the charges
against the petitioners, and what penalty should be imposed, are not preliminary,
preparatory, procedural, or intermediate. The petitioners have failed to identify any
further actions that were needed after the April 27, 2007 Order other than for it to be
enforced. It met the third test for being a final agency action.
The April 27, 2007 Order was the final agency action and the petitioners' time for
filing for judicial review ran from its entry. The order to show cause dated June 29, 2007
was not a final agency action. R. 61. It did not determine whether the petitioners had
violated Utah law. It did not establish what sanction, if any, should be imposed on the
petitioners. It was an effort to enforce the final agency action that had been entered in
April. Petitioners cannot circumvent their failure to seek review from the final agency
10

action by raising their challenges to a separate enforcement proceeding. CSRB v. Dep't
ofCom, 942 P.2d 933, 939 (Utah 1997).
In CSRB, the Department of Corrections had failed to seek judicial review from
the final agency action, but had also failed to comply with the CSRB's order. The
Department then sought to challenge the final agency action when the CSRB brought a
civil enforcement proceeding pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-19 (West 2004).
While agency actions such as the Board's adjudication of Parker's grievance
may be continued in the civil court system by filing an appeal in the Utah
Court of Appeals, see §§ 63-46b-14, -16, an action seeking enforcement of
a final order is not a continuation of the grievance. Corrections declined its
opportunity to appeal and cannot now successfully argue that the Parker
grievance is still pending. The fact that agencies may seek enforcement of
their orders against recalcitrant parties in the civil courts does not mean that
their decisions are not final until enforced by the courts. The enforcement
action before us now is not a continuation of the former administrative
adjudication, but a separate action to enforce the order in Parker's grievance
proceeding.

14
Ongoing enforcement proceedings, such as the June 29, 2007 order, are not
continuations of the administrative proceeding that concluded with the final agency action
entered in April, 2007. The Commission's efforts to enforce its order are similar to
supplemental proceedings that seek to enforce a civil judicial judgment. Neither affects
the finality of the orders that they seek to implement. The district court correctly rejected
the petitioners' efforts to extend the time in which to challenge the final agency action by
using the enforcement actions brought about by their failure to comply.
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In the instant [case], Petitioners were ordered, on April 27, 2007, to
pay certain fines and costs assessed against them. Their failure to pay such
fines in compliance with the order necessitated an order to show cause.
This order to show cause, however, falls outside the administrative
procedures act and cannot be utilized to extend the time for appeal. Indeed,
permitting such extensions would, in effect, condone noncompliance with
the Commission's final order of April 27, 2007.
R. 173.
The district court correctly dismissed this action for lack of jurisdiction. That
decision should be affirmed on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The only issue before this Court is whether the district court had jurisdiction to
hear this petition for judicial review. For the above stated reasons, respondent asks this
Court to affirm the district court's determination that it lacked jurisdiction to consider
petitioner's untimely appeal.
RESPONDENT DOES NOT DESIRE ORAL
ARGUMENT OR A PUBLISHED OPINION
Respondent-appellee does not request oral argument and a published opinion in
this matter. The questions raised in this appeal are such that respondent believes oral
argument will not be of assistance to the Court in reviewing and deciding this matter.
Respondent does desire to participate in oral argument if such is held by the Court.
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Respectfully submitted this 7-3

V

day of May, 2008.

BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent - Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact copies of the foregoing Brief of
Respondent - Appellee, postage prepaid, to the following on this Z.J
2008:
DOUGLAS A. GUBLER
4659 S. Highland Dr.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
JOSEPH L. ANDERSON
322 University St. #4
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorneys for Petitioners-Appellants
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ADDENDUM "A

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (West 2004).
Judicial review — Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, except in actions
where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute.
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies
available, except that:
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative remedies if this
chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not required;
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to exhaust any
or all administrative remedies if:
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the public
benefit derived from requiring exhaustion.
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action within 30
days after the date that the order constituting the final agency action is issued or is
considered to have been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b).
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate parties as respondents
and shall meet the form requirements specified in this chapter.

ADDENDUM "B

I N THE D I S T R I C T COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL D I S T R I C T
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RUGBY PUB, LLC a n d JERALD
SARAFOLEAN,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Petitioners,

Case No. -0709010€«9. Q ^

Q^XQ^lsA

Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI

vs

DEPARTMENT OF ALCOHOL BEVERAGE
CONTROL, STATE OF UTAH,

October 29,

FILED DISTRICT COUBT
2 0tfRj rd judicial District

Defendants.
Deputy Clerk

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and
Petitioner's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

The Court

heard oral argument with respect to the motions on October 29,
2007.

Following the hearing, the matters were taken under

advisement.
The Court having considered the motions and memoranda and
for the good cause shown, hereby enters the following ruling.
Turning initially to the motion to dismiss, Respondent notes
that Petitioners filed a Complaint with this Court seeking
judicial review of the Utah Alcoholic Beverage Control
Commission's Order dated June 29, 2007, directing the Rugby Pub's
"on Premise Beer Bond" filed with the Department be forfeited to
pay fines and costs owed to the Department, pursuant to the
Commission's April 27, 2007 decision and order on a licensing

1—1 I

RUGBY PUB v. DABC

Page 2

violation action against Petitioners.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

According to the

Department, the Court must dismiss Petitioners' Complaint because
this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction as Petitioners'
attempt of judicial review is untimely.

Specifically, argues the

Department, Petitioners were required to file their Complaint
within the thirty days following the April 27, 2007 Commission
Order, which would be May 27, 2007.
Respondent contends state law is clear that petitioners are
only entitled to "one bite at the apple" on reconsideration.
Therefore, argues Respondent, since Petitioners did not file any
challenge to the order, including the penalty, until July 31,
2007, it is necessary and in the interest of justice to dismiss
the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
In opposition to the motion, Petitioner contends a
subsequent order was made on June 29, 2007 and Petitioners timely
appealed that order on July 27, 2007, less than thirty days from
the final order issued by the Commission.

Indeed, argue

Petitioners, following the hearing on Respondent's motion for
order to show cause, it was determined and ordered that there
were grounds to forfeit Petitioners' compliance bond.

According

to Petitioners, the issue before the Court is what "constitutes
final agency action" for purposes of filing an appeal.

In this

case, contend Petitioners, it is clear that the order issued by

RUGBY PUB v. DABC

Page 3

MEMORANDUM DECISION

the Commission on April 27, 2007 was not final in that it was
merely a preparatory or an intermediate order that required an
order to show cause to determine whether the compliance bond
could be forfeited.

Thereafter, assert

Petitioners, a hearing

was held in which it was determined that the compliance bond
could be forfeited.
filed this appeal.

Petitioners disagreed with such decision and
Finally, assert Petitioners, Rule 81 does not

provide for any fine unless it is in conjunction with revocation
or suspension of a license and in this case, Petitioners7 license
was never revoked.
In the instant, Petitioners were ordered, on April 27, 2007,
to pay certain fines and costs assessed against them.

Their

failure to pay such fines in compliance with the order
necessitated an order to show cause.

This order to show cause,

however, falls outside the administrative procedures act and
cannot be utilized to extend the time for appeal.

Indeed,

permitting such extensions would, in effect, condone
noncompliance with the Commission's final order of April 27,
2007.
Based upon the forgoing, the Court finds it lacks
jurisdiction to hear the matter and, accordingly, grants
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss.

Indeed, while Petitioners'

claims may have merit, the Court does not reach their motion as

1-13.

RUGBY PUB v. DABC
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

such is procedurally barred due to the untimely filing of the
Complaint.
DATED this

*

day of Gtrtrcfo^r, 2007.
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